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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Congress amended the Copyright Act to bring it in line with
international norms.' The amendments, collectively referred to as the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, effected a range of changes, includ-
ing those relating to copyright notice.2 Since that time, copyright notice has
been optional, not mandatory. Thus, notice has not been a prerequisite to
copyright protection for more than twenty years. But despite Congress'
plainly stated intent, litigants have argued, and some courts have stated, that
copyright notice is still required for a narrow yet very important category of
works, specifically: certain advertisements appearing in a collective work
(e.g., a "yellow pages" telephone directory). This article aims to demonstrate
that a plain reading of the Copyright Act belies any contention that notice is
ever a prerequisite to copyright protection in this context. Part One discusses
pre-Berne copyright standards, Part Two elaborates on the particulars of the
Berne amendments and the seminal case there under, Part Three discusses
recent post-Berne case law, and Part Four suggests what is needed to bring
current judicial practice into line with a correct reading of the Berne
Amendments.
* B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Kansas; J.D., Washburn; LL.M., Columbia; Ph.D., Edin-
burgh. Mr. Gordon is a partner with the firm of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP
and an adjunct faculty member at Southern Methodist University. He wishes to
thank James McKain, his research assistant and a student at the University of
Kansas, for his considerable contribution to the authorities cited below and
Tom Wright, a partner in the Firm, for his helpful analysis of the issues
presented. The views expressed in this Article are the author's alone and do
not necessarily represent those of the Firm or its clients.
1. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-22 (West 2009).
2. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
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1. Pre-Berne Convention Standards.
Before March 1, 1989, the effective date of the Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act, the Copyright Act had very strict notice requirements,
some of which cause confusion to this day. It is thus worthwhile to work
through the pre-Berne Copyright Act and consider at least one representative
case from the pre-Berne period. To state a claim for copyright infringement,
a plaintiff must show three things: 1) that he owns the copyright(s), 3 2) that
the copyright has been properly registered,4 and 3) that the defendant copied
elements of the work that are original.5 Once a plaintiff has sufficiently pled
these elements, he has established a prima facie case. 6 The Berne Conven-
tion is a factor in the analysis because it establishes the outer temporal
boundary of a complete defense based on lack of proper notice.7 That is, a
defendant has a good defense to a copyright claim to the extent that he can
show "that plaintiff first published the [work] without a copyright notice ...
prior to the enactment of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
. . . which obviated the requirement of a copyright notice[,] and, conse-
quently, injected the [work] into the public domain and thus forfeited his
exclusive copyright in it."8 Therefore, as a general proposition, "works pub-
lished without a copyright notice prior to the enactment of the Berne Con-
vention . . . are injected into the public domain and thus lose any copyright
3. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (West 2009) ("The legal or beneficial owner of an
exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of
section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right
committed while he or she is the owner of it.").
4. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2009) ("No civil action for infringement ...
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title."). "[R]egistration with the copyright
office is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a copyright infringement suit."
Creations Unlimited, Inc. v. McCain, t12 F.3d 8t4, 816 (5th Cir. 1997). None-
theless, there is a difference of opinion amongst the circuits as to whether the
process must be completed before filing suit. See, e.g., Positive Black Talk
Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Al-
though some circuits require that a plaintiff actually obtain a certificate from
the Copyright Office before bringing suit, the Fifth Circuit requires only that
the Copyright Office actually receive the application, deposit, and fee before a
plaintiff files an infringement action.").
5. To establish "actionable" copying, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) factual copying
and (2) substantial similarity." Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d at 367. See also
Gen. Universal Sys. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004) (A "plaintiff
must, as a factual matter, prove that the defendant 'actually used the copy-
righted material to create his own work.") (quoting Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v.
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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protection to which they might otherwise have been entitled."9 This rule
applied, and still applies, though less frequently with the passage of time,
across the board.Io But what of the special case of separate items collected
into a single work such as a short-story collection? Another similar question
deals with the special case of advertisements inserted into a collection, such
as a magazine.
In the pre-Berne era, the Copyright Act stated, much as it does today:
A separate contribution to a collective work may bear its own no-
tice of copyright, as provided by sections 401 through 403. How-
ever, a single notice applicable to the collective work as a whole is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sections 401 through 403
with respect to the separate contributions it contains (not including
advertisements inserted on behalf of persons other than the owner
of copyright in the collective work), regardless of the ownership
of copyright in the contributions and whether or not they have
been previously published."
Courts interpreted this to mean that a party desiring to copyright an adver-
tisement that it published in a collective work on behalf of another must
clearly mark the advertisement itself with a notice (e.g., @ or other sufficient
substitute).12 In other words, a general copyright notice on the collective
work would not preserve copyright on an individual advertisement unless the
advertisement itself was marked.
In Canfield v. Ponchatoula Times, the Fifth Circuit examined this issue
as a matter of first impression.13 The facts of Canfield were undisputed:14
The Enterprise, a weekly newspaper that plaintiff Canfield published, had
printed an advertisement at the request of a salesman for an automobile
9. Id.; see also Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assoc., 764 F.2d
69, 72 (2d Cir. 1985) (Pre-Berne Implementation Amendment case holding
that, "[i]n general, publication of a work without a proper notice of copyright
affixed injects the work into the public domain."); Greenwich Film Prods., S.A.
v. DRG Records, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 0546 (JISM), 1992 WL 279357, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1992) ("For works published prior to March 1, 1989, the
effective date of the Berne Implementation Amendments, notice is a condition
to protection of the work. Absent notice, the work is forfeited and enters, by
operation of law, the public domain.").
10. See, e.g., Neimark, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (plaintiff first published drawing
without notice prior to Beme Act).
I1. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1982).
12. See 2-7 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§7.12 n.38 (2009). See also Royal Mills, 764 F.2d at 72.
13. Canfield v. Ponchatoula Times, 759 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1985).
14. Id. at 494.
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dealer.15 The car salesman "provided The Enterprise with the information to
be advertised, chose the size of the ad, and posed for a photograph taken by
The Enterprise."16 In addition to taking the photo, the newspaper "designed,
composed and printed the advertisement."17 The Enterprise, however, did
not inform the salesman or his dealership that it claimed a copyright to the
advertisement.18 Subsequently, the salesman contacted a rival newspaper,
The Ponchatoula Times, and asked it to run a similar ad.19 He gave The
Times a copy of the ad that had run in The Enterprise and told The Times to
use the same format, including the photograph.20 The Times made only "in-
significant changes" and ran an ad that was essentially indistinguishable from
the ad that had run in The Enterprise.2' Soon after both ads had run, The
Enterprise acquired a "Certificate of Copyright Registration" for the entire
edition of the newspaper in which the advertisement had first run, including
"original photographs."22 The Enterprise gave notice of copyright to the en-
tire newspaper under its masthead; it did not affix a separate notice to the
advertisement.23 Plaintiff then sued for copyright infringement based on its
general notice and registration.24
The court began its analysis by casting these facts in light of Section
404(a) and its declaration that "the individual contributions comprising a col-
lective work may be protected under a single notice of copyright applicable
to the collective work as a whole."25 But that proposition, the court quickly
noted, did not answer the question presented because "[a]dvertisements are
different. The parenthetical phrase emphasized above expressly exempts ad-
vertisements from the general rules of section 404(a). Advertisements in-
serted in a collective work on behalf of persons other than the collective
work copyright owner are not protected by a copyright notice applicable to
the work as a whole."26 Thus, the court concluded "[t]his case falls precisely
within the parameters of the advertising exception to section 404(a)" because











25. Id. at 495.
26. Id.
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rather than The Enterprise, the owner of copyright in the collective work.27
And since no specific copyright notice appeared directly on the advertise-
ment itself,
The Enterprise [could not] protect its asserted copyright in the ad-
vertisement by relying on the general collective work notice of
copyright printed . . . under the masthead. The statutory language
is clear; the general copyright notice in a newspaper, or other col-
lective work, will not suffice as notice that ownership rights are
asserted in advertisements published on behalf of persons other
than those named in the copyright notice.28
To support its position, the court reviewed the notes of the House Judi-
ciary Committee pertaining to section 404(a) and found reflected therein a
clearly expressed congressional intent to exclude advertisements from the
general rule that a single copyright notice in a collective work protects each
contribution in it.29 Thus, on the flip side, "there is no doubt Congress in-
tended to carve out a special exception for advertisements which would re-
quire that a separate copyright notice appear in the advertisement itself."30
According to the court, Congress believed that the statutory carve-out was
necessary because advertisements were regarded as a unique form of copy-
rightable material.31 This "uniqueness" is a function of how advertising
works: advertisements are commonly published in multiple outlets and, with
respect to advertisements published in major advertising media such as news-
papers and magazines, without individual copyright notice.32 From all this,
the court concluded that
The language in the committee notes indicates Congress intended
to adopt the presumption that advertisements, although copyright-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 495-96.
29. Id. at 496. The House Report from which the Court quotes states:
Collective works, notably newspapers and magazines, are major advertis-
ing media, and it is common for the same advertisement to be published in
a number of different periodicals. The general copyright notice in a partic-
ular issue would not ordinarily protect the advertisements inserted in it,
and relatively little advertising matter today is published with a separate
copyright notice. The exception in section 404(a), under which separate
notices would be required for most advertisements published in collective
works, would impose no undue burdens on copyright owners and is justi-
fied by the special circumstances.
30. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 146 (1976), reprinted in
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able, are not generally copyrighted and often widely reprinted.
Consequently, when an advertiser gives a publisher an advertise-
ment which has been published previously in another publication
and has no copyright notice affixed, it would be logical for the
publisher to presume both that no copyright was claimed by the
prior publisher and that reprinting of the advertisement verbatim
would not infringe any right of the prior publisher. The proof
shows these were the operative facts in this case. The Times was
entitled to presume it could reprint the Community Motors adver-
tisement for Community Motors without fear of copyright
infringement.33
After Canfield, other courts picked up on its holding and applied it across a
range of similar fact patterns. 34 But then Congress passed the Berne Act and
rewrote the rules.
2. The Berne Convention and Advertisements: The Early Years
To harmonize US copyright law with international standards, in 1988
Congress passed legislation implementing the Berne Convention, which be-
came effective in 1989. After the Berne Convention Implementation Act
("Berne Act"), notice is no longer a prerequisite to copyright protection.35
33. Id. Plaintiff also argued that, because it owned a copyright in the collective
work and the ad the carve-out of Section 404(a) did not apply. The Court
rejected that argument on the ground that the linchpin of the exception is not
ownership but agency. In other words, separate notice is required when an
advertisement is inserted on behalf of someone other than the owner of the
copyright in the collective work. Id.
34. See, e.g., E. Publ'g & Adver., Inc. v. Chesapeake Publ'g & Adver., Inc., 831
F.2d 488, 490-9 1 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other
grounds, 492 U.S. 913 (1989) (newspaper advertisement); Donald Frederick
Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Cont'l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 906-07 (11th Cir.
1986) (architectural drawings appearing in advertising supplement to newspa-
per); Moore Publ'g, Inc. v. Big Sky Mktg., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (D.
Idaho 1990) (real estate advertising magazines).
35. See, e.g., Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 48 (5th Cir.
1995) ("[Slince the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, ... notice
is no longer a prerequisite to copyright protection. . . ."); KB. Home v. Antares
Homes, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 304CV1031L, 2005 WL 3591149 at *3 n.3 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 29, 2005) ( "On March 1, 1989, the United States' adherence to the
Berne Convention abolished affixation of notice as a statutory requirement for
securing copyright."); Computrac, Inc. v. Law Firm Consulting Serv., No.
3:95-CV-0754-D , 1997 WL 42525 at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 1997) ("Publica-
tions of copyrightable works after March 1, 1989 are not subject to the notice
requirements of pre-March 1, 1989 publications because of the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act"); Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines
Ticketing Ctrs, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 709, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The 1976 Act
6 [Vol. XIII
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Thus, a copyright holder can sue on a copyright even if he has not marked
the object that is subject to copyright. Nonetheless, the Berne Act provides
certain incentives to copyright owners who affix a copyright notice to each
publicly distributed copy of a work. 36 For example, the Berne Act amended
the Copyright Act to add a new subsection "d" to Sections 401 and 402. The
Berne Act also amended Section 404(a) so that new sections 401(d) and
402(d) are the sole statutory benefit for affixing copyright notice to a collec-
tive work.37 This means that if notice is given "in the form and position
specified" by Section 401 of the Copyright Act, then, in a lawsuit based on
copyright infringement of that work, "no weight shall be given to. . .a defen-
dant's interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement."38 Thus, if
a plaintiff has not given notice, the defendant is not stripped of its "innocent
infringement" defense. But that's all that a plaintiff loses by omitting notice.
Against this backdrop, we can better understand Section 404(a), the sec-
tion that still contains the pre-Berne language concerning contributions to
collective works. Section 404(a) shows how the owner of a contribution to a
collective work may go about giving notice sufficient to invoke the defense-
stripping incentive of Section 401 (i.e., the section discussed in the previous
paragraph). The owner may do this by using "a single notice applicable to
the collective work as a whole," except "for advertisements inserted on be-
half of persons other than the owner of copyright in the collective work."39
Sure enough, this exception applies to advertisements appearing in newspa-
pers or directories. So, to return to the newspaper example from Canfield, if
the case were to arise today instead of before the Berne Act and if The Enter-
prise had individually "noticed" the advertisement, instead of just the work
as a whole, then The Ponchatoula Times would not be permitted to raise an
innocent infringement defense in mitigation of the damages it caused The
was amended by the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which
eliminated the notice requirement completely. Thus, while the current statute
states that 'a notice of copyright . . . may be placed on publicly distributed
copies,' affixing notice is no longer mandatory for works first published after
March 1, 1989.") (internal citations omitted; underlining added).
36. Garnier v. Andin Int'l, Inc., 36 F.3d 1214, 1219 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[E]ffective
March 1, 1989, the attachment of notice of copyright is no longer required to
gain copyright protection for creative works, although it is still encouraged
through various incentives.").
37. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. 4262, 100th Cong.,
102 Stat. 2853, Section 7; Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc.,
322 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The Berne Convention Implementation Act
... made notice optional rather than mandatory, while retaining incentives to
encourage notice.").
38. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a).
2009] 7
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Enterprise.40 To the contrary, if The Enterprise had not individually "no-
ticed" the advertisement, then The Ponchatoula Times would not be statuto-
rily barred from raising an innocent infringement defense. But today, that
would be the only effect of failure to put an individual notice on the
advertisement.41
Unfortunately, taking a belts-and-suspenders approach, the Berne Act
has created confusion by carrying forward statutory language and structure
from the then-existing Copyright Act. Put differently, as demonstrated by
one leading commentator, the advertisement exclusion of Section 404(a) "is
meaningless."42 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit-the only court to consider
the issue-erred in its analysis of the Berne Act's impact on collective
works.43 We will turn to that case after a short aside concerning the subject-
matter of that case. This will be helpful in showing why the rules concerning
advertisements in collective works are of great concern to a vigorously com-
petitive industry that has grown considerably over the last fifty years: tele-
phone directories.44
At some point, enterprising entrepreneurs discovered that there was a
market for specialized telephone directories covering areas larger or smaller
than a telephone company's franchise area.45 The first hurdle for these mar-
ket entrants was to obtain basic "white pages" information-i.e., names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers. Sometimes these independent publishers
were able to license information from a carrier, but sometimes they were
not.46
From this second scenario grew Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co.47 Rural Telephone ("Rural") was a public utility provid-
40. Cf. Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A.03-4962, 2005
WL 67077 at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005) (barring defendants from raising
"innocent infringement" defense in face of properly noticed collective work).
41. NIMMER ET AL., supra note 12, § 2.08[G][4][a] (noting that advertisements
published in collective works that are not individually marked with copyright
notice are "treated as if published without notice," and further noting that such
works could be injected into the public domain if they were published before
the implementation of the Berne Convention).
42. Id. § 7.12[C][l] at 7-96.
43. Transwestern Publ'g Co. v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., 133 F. 3d 773 (10th
Cir. 1998).
44. See BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g. Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g., 999 F.2d
1436, 1471 (1 Ith Cir. 1993) (Hatchett, dissenting) (noting "multi-billion dol-
lar" size of directory publishing market).
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ing telephone service to several small communities in northwest Kansas.48
As a condition for operating as a monopoly franchise, Rural was required to
update and issue a telephone directory.49 Rural's directory included both
white and yellow pages.O Feist Publications ("Feist") was a company that
compiled and published area-wide directories that covered a much larger ge-
ographical range than that of Rural and other more localized franchisees.51
Both companies distributed their directories free of charge and both derived
substantial revenue from yellow-pages advertisements, for which they vigor-
ously competed. 52
Rural's refusal to license information left Feist with three choices. It
could publish without the Rural's information and leave a gaping hole in its
directory, conduct a telephone or door-to-door survey and collect the infor-
mation on its own or take Rural's information and publish it without permis-
sion. 53 Nevertheless, Feist chose the third option, Rural sued for copyright
infringement, and the Supreme Court ultimately held that Feist did not in-
fringe Rural's copyright because Rural's white pages "lack[ed] the requisite
originality" for copyright protection.54
Although Feist was ostensibly about basic white pages listings, the true
battleground was yellow pages and the lucrative advertising sales that go
along with them. This was made clear in a line of cases following Feist.
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publish-
ing represents an extension of Feist's animating principles to a yellow pages
directory.55 A subsidiary of BellSouth published a yellow pages directory for
the Greater Miami area.56 The directory was organized via an alphabetical
list of business classifications.57 After BellSouth published its 1984 direc-
tory, Donnelley began to market and sell classified advertisements to be
placed in a competing directory.58 To facilitate this process, Donnelley cop-
ied BellSouth's directory and hired a data-entry company to create "a data
base containing the name, address, and telephone number of the subscriber as
48. Id. at 342.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 342-43.
52. Id. at 343. For a thorough analysis of Feist and its implications, see Jane C.
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Informa-
tion After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992).
53. Id. at 343-44.
54. Id. at 364.
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well as codes corresponding to business type and unit of advertising."59
Donnelley used the data base to create sales lead sheets and, ultimately, to
prepare its competing directory. 60 Based on these acts, BellSouth sued for
copyright infringement.61
The parties stipulated that BellSouth's directory, "which is a typical yel-
low pages directory, qualifies for compilation copyright protection."62 Thus,
"[tihe pivotal issue [was] whether that which was copied by the alleged in-
fringer was protected by the registered claim of compilation copyright."63
The court found that it was not because, among other things, the copied ma-
terial did not exhibit requisite "originality."64 But, we-as did the court-
must "note that Donnelley did not copy, nor was it alleged to have copied,
the text or graphic material from the advertisements in the [BellSouth] direc-
tory, the positioning of these advertisements, the typeface, or the textual ma-
terial included by [BellSouth] to assist the user."65 Thus, it remains for us to
consider post-Berne and post-Feist cases involving the copying of "original"
and (therefore copyrightable) advertisements.
Transwestern Publishing Co. v. Media Marketing Associates, Inc. is the
most important (for any discussion) post-Feist cases involving alleged misap-
propriation of yellow pages advertisements.66 The Tenth Circuit's decision
in Transwestern warrants a close examination because it has caused and con-
tinues to cause much confusion. Four years after Feist was decided, Trans-
Western published a "Ponca City [Oklahoma] Area" telephone directory that
included both white and yellow pages advertisements.67 Defendants thereaf-
ter published a competing directory, the "1996 Ponca City Community Di-
rectory," which covered a smaller geographic area (8 towns versus 18) but
also included white and yellow pages advertisements.68 "A number of these
advertisements were very comparable to those in the TransWestern direc-
tory."69 Therefore, the gravamen of TransWestern's infringement case was
59. Id. at 1439.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1438.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1440-45.
65. Id. at 1445; cf. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Assoc'd Tel. Directory Publishers,
756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985) (infringer engaged in wholesale copying of com-
petitor's directory).
66. Transwestern Publ'g, 133 F.3d at 774.
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that defendants had copied advertisements from its directory.70 The court
looked at the infringement claim-to the extent that it was based on individ-
ual advertisements-in two related ways: first, by treating TransWestern's
directory as a "compilation" and second, by treating it as a collective work.7'
The first inquiry was suggested by TransWestern's copyright registration,
which "treats [the directory] as a 'derivative work or compilation' and states
it is a '[Rlevised compilation in yellow pages.'"72 The court rejected this
claim on evidentiary grounds, namely that the record did not show "original
and hence protectible contributions by plaintiff to its yellow pages ads" and,
moreover, with respect to certain ads about which plaintiff complained,
"there is nothing in the appellate record to show defendants copied any of
those ads."73
The court next moved to the second potential basis for copyright protec-
tion-namely, that "the ads should not be treated as fact compilations but as
unique creations."74 It is at this point that the court jumped the post-Berne
track by following Canfield to conclude that "under 17 U.S.C § 404(a), the
existence of a copyright notice on plaintiffs directory is insufficient to pro-
hibit the copying of an advertisement from that directory, absent a copyright
notice specific to the advertisement itself."75
This holding is difficult to justify, especially given that a concurring
opinion distinctively pointed out the error in the court's analysis.76 Indeed,
the majority opinion nods in the direction of the concurrence and even con-
cedes that under Berne "copyright notice is no longer mandatory."77 But
then it inexplicably reverts-in a non sequitur-to the fact that 404(a) main-
tained the parenthetical exception for advertising after Berne: "Where the
overall collective work is protected by a copyright notice, § 404(a) still ref-
uses to extend the protection afforded by that notice to ads inserted by a third
party."78 But that begs the question presented: after Berne, no notice is re-
quired at all for copyright protection under § 404(a) or otherwise?
To sum up Trans Western, the Berne Act was not at issue, and indeed,
the holding was that there was no infringement. In any event, the concurring
opinion is absolutely correct in three respects critical to an analysis of the
70. Id.
71. Id. at 779-81.
72. Id. at 776.
73. Id. at 779. The court also found that the directories were dissimilar "as a
whole." Id. at 777.
74. Id. at 779.
75. Id. at 781.
76. Id. at 782 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 781.
78. Id. at 781 n.5.
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advertising exception. First, Canfield "is inapplicable because it was issued
prior to adoption of the Berne.
3. Recent Developments: No Consensus
TransWestern's pronouncement regarding the meaning of the advertis-
ing exception was subject to immediate criticism in academic literature.79
Nonetheless, defendants in copyright infringement cases have continued to
successfully argue that-based on Canfield and Trans Western-individual
notice on advertisements in collective works is a prerequisite to copyright
protection.80 For example, within a year after the Tenth Circuit decided
TransWestern, a district court used lack of notice as one of two alternative
grounds for dismissing a claim that defendants had infringed upon plaintiff's
copyright by distributing classified advertisements copied in a periodical:
"The Copyright Act provides that while contributions to a collective work
can be protected by a single copyright notice for the work as a whole, an
exception is made for 'advertisements inserted on behalf of persons other
than the owner of the copyright in the collective work."'81
More recently, however, in a few noteworthy decisions courts have
failed to buy into defenses jerry-rigged from the TransWestern dicta.82 An
example of this is found in Idearc Media Corp. v. Northwest Directories,
Inc., which arose from a scenario novel only in the scope of the copyright
infringement dealt with.83 In 2006, Idearc (formerly known as Verizon Di-
rectories Services) published and distributed a white and yellow pages direc-
tory in Yamhill County, Oregon.84 Northwest Directories scanned and
copied all the display ads (i.e., ads including graphics, colors and text beyond
name, address and telephone number of a business) that appeared in Idearc's
79. See, e.g., Darryl J. Adams, Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 6 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 317, 328-35 (1998) ("[T]he Tenth Circuit erroneously inter-
preted Section 404(a) of the Copyright Act as requiring mandatory copyright
notices on advertisements within collective works. This interpretation is con-
trary to the clear language of the statute and the spirit of Berne-era copyright
law.").
80. See Phoenix Hill Enters., Inc. v. Dickerson, No. 3:98CV-669(R), 1999 WL
33603127 at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 20, 1999); DND Commc'ns, LLC v. 21
Publ'g, LLC, No. 4:08-CV-97-DJS, 2008 WL 4290849 at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. Sept.
16, 2008).
81. Phoenix Hill Enters., Inc. 1999 WL 33603127, at *1.
82. See Idearc Media Corp. v. Nw. Directories, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229 (D. Or.
2008); Agreed Permanent Injunction as to Defendant Your Town Yellow
Pages, LLC, and Dismissal With Prejudice at 2-3, GoPubCo, Inc. v. Your
Town Yellow Pages, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-0489 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2007).
83. Idearc Media Corp., 623 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
84. Id.
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2006 directory and reproduced them in its own 2007 directory.85 Idearc
brought suit against Northwest Directories, alleging infringement of the cop-
yright in its 2006 directory.86 Northwest Directories defended on a number
of grounds, including Idearc's failure to individually mark the display ads.87
The Court initially considered whether a telephone directory is a "com-
pilation" or a "collective work," the latter being a subset of the former.88 A
compilation is defined by statute as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated,
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship."89 On the other hand, a collective work "is a
work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a num-
ber of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in them-
selves, are assembled into a collective whole."90 The Court found that "the
directory [had] some attributes of both a collective work and a
compilation."91
"[B]ecause the 2006 directory is a collective work," Northwest Directo-
ries argued, "even if the display ads are subject to copyright, Idearc cannot
sue to enforce that copyright absent the publication of a separate copyright
notice on each ad."92 Unsurprisingly, "[iun support of this argument NWD
cites 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) and the Tenth Circuit opinion in Trans Western Pub-
lishing Co. v. MultimediaMarketingAssociates, Inc."93 The Court compared
the majority and concurring opinions in TransWestern and noted the factual
similarity between Trans Western and the present case: "[T]here is no dispute
that the 2006 directory bears a copyright notice, but that the ads at issue do
not bear such a notice."94 Thus, faced with a case substantially similar to
TransWestern, the Court had two choices-either follow the majority opin-
ion or offer good reason not to. It chose the latter:
The court does not agree with the Trans Western majority's view
of 17 U.S.C. § 404(a), which is both orbiter dictum and not bind-
ing precedent. The plain meaning of § 404(a) is that absence of a
copyright notice on "advertisements inserted on behalf of persons
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1229.
88. Id.
89. Idearc Media Corp. v. Nw. Directories, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1226 (D. Or.





94. Id. at 1229-30.
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other than the owner of the copyright in the collective work" sim-
ply eliminates the evidentiary presumption against innocent in-
fringement provided by 17 U.S.C. § 401(d). Eliminating this
presumption has no bearing on the existence of enforceable rights
in the ad. This understanding of the statute is consistent with the
fact that a copyright notice is not required to hold a valid copy-
right. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 . . . .95
The Court also found that Idearc's registration of the entire directory
was sufficient to constitute registration of the misappropriated ads.96 The
Court noted "[t]his understanding of the law also comports with common
sense. It would be absurd and inefficient to require the author of a larger
work to individually register every possible smaller component of that work
that qualified individually for copyright protection."97
Another recent case requires a little extra analysis due to the absence of
a written opinion in order to conclude a court again declined to follow Trans-
Western. Factually, GoPubCo, Inc. v. Your Town Yellow Pages, LLC follows
the standard pattern of the cases we have been reviewing.98 Here, GoPubCo
and Your Town published competing telephone directories that were distrib-
uted in several Dallas/Fort Worth communities.99 GoPubCo alleged that
Your Town substantially or identically reproduced and reprinted 33 of
GoPubCo's yellow pages ads in Your Town's directoriesoo GoPubCo did
not mark each of the 33 ads with a separate copyright notice.oI Your Town
moved for summary judgment, arguing that "[t]he Copyright Act requires a
separate copyright notice to be placed on any advertisement inserted on be-
half of others. Because GoPubCo failed to place a copyright notice on the 33
Ads . . . the 33 Ads have been placed in the public domain, and GoPubCo
thus cannot maintain an action for copyright infringement on the 33 Ads."102
As authority for these propositions, Your Town principally offered Canfield
and Trans Western.103 GoPubCo challenged these authorities, arguing that
Canfield was no longer good law in the wake of the Berne Act and that
95. Idearc Media Corp. v. Nw. Directories, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230 (D. Or.
2008).
96. Id. at 1230-31.
97. Id. at 1230.
98. Plaintiffs Original Complaint at 2-3, GoPubCo, Inc. v. Your Town Yellow
Pages, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-0489-K (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2006).
99. Id.
100. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7,
GoPubCo, Inc. v. Your Town Yellow Pages, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-0489-K (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 7, 2006).
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 11.
103. See id. at 16-23.
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TransWestern was simply wrong because it mistook the post-Berne incentive
structure for the pre-Berne loss-of-copyright structure. 04 Although the Court
did not write an opinion, it tacitly held that GoPubCo was correct. 05 We
may infer this from the Court's issuance of a permanent injunction as to Your
Town because Your Town offered its reading of 404(a) as a completely dis-
positive matter and as a matter of law. In other words, no facts relevant to
this issue were disputed; thus, in issuing the permanent injunction, the Court
must have rejected Your Town's argument and accepted GoPubCo's counter-
vailing argument. 0 6
Despite the clear holding of Idearc and the inferential authority of
GoPubCo, TransWestern continues to bedevil this corner of the law. In
DND Communications, LLC v. 21 Publishing, LLC, the Court was faced with
a Canfield-type scenario.107 There, the plaintiff had created and published a
pair of advertisements (for a jeweler and a hair salon) in its local-interest
periodical, Saint Charles Magazine; the defendant allegedly reproduced and
published these ads without authorization in its competing periodical, Mid
Rivers Newsmagazine.108 Plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, and De-
fendant moved to dismiss based on a failure-to-notice theory.109 Defendant
argued that courts have "consistently held that an advertisement lacking a
separate copyright notice as it appears within a collective work is not a pro-
tectible expression."a, o As authority, defendant cited Canfield and Trans-
Western.]', The Court quickly brushed Canfield aside, noting that it was
decided pre-Berne.1 2 But TransWestern proved another matter because the
Court read it as a resuscitation of Canfield's central holding: "[T]he Tenth
Circuit holds that the Berne Convention did not affect the parenthetical pro-
vision of § 404(a), and so did not alter the analysis of Canfield.""13
Plaintiff countered with the usual post-Berne defense-namely that "af-
ter the Berne Convention the result is not lack of copyright protection, but
rather the availability of the so-called innocent infringement defense in miti-
104. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-6,
GoPubCo, Inc. v. Your Town Yellow Pages, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-0489-K (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 27, 2006).
105. See Agreed Permanent Injunction as to Defendant Your Town Yellow Pages,
LLC, and Dismissal With Prejudice, supra note 82, at 2-3.
106. See id.
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gation of damages.",14 The Court found this argument "reasonable" and not
without support in Judge Briscoe's TransWestern concurrence, but, nonethe-
less rejected it because it "is directly at odds with the majority opinion of the
only Court of Appeals which has addressed the specific question on highly
analogous facts . . . ."15 Accordingly, the Court chose to "follow the view of
the TransWestern majority" and dismissed the complaint."16
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Because the unfortunate and redundant structure of Section 404(a)-
when coupled with the erroneous reading of that section in TransWestern-
continues to dog both courts and litigants, we would be remiss if we didn't
consider how best to correct the problem. Congress could, of course, tinker
with the statute, but that seems at once unlikely and something of an overkill,
given that the statute has a plain enough (if somewhat circuitously arrived at)
meaning. The real problem is with TransWestern (and its status as the only
court of appeals opinion on the subject), and the solution is for the Tenth
Circuit to disavow the problematic dictum found in the majority opinion. To
provoke such an action, lower courts should continue to criticize TransWest-
ern and give roadmap readings of Section 404 in published opinions. Thus,
when an appropriate case arrives at the Tenth Circuit, the court will be armed
with sufficient, well-reasoned precedent with which to brush aside the erro-
neous statutory construction.
To sum up, although general collective-work notice does not extend to
individual advertisements in a collective work, that does not mean the owner
of copyrights in those advertisements loses the copyrights when she does not
individually mark each ad with a copyright notice. It merely means that she
may not avail herself of certain incentives that Congress provided for those
who do give individual notice. To the extent that TransWestern states other-
wise, it has the law wrong and no court should follow its dictum.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *2.
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